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DECISIONS.

Sultreme .0ourt of Errors of Connecticut.
KELLOGG V. JOHNSON.
An order of a Court of Probate directing the estate of an intestate to be dis.
tributedto the persons whom such court finds to be the heirs at law and entitled
to the estate is conclusive, and furnishes full protection to the administrator
until set aside on appeal.

DEBT on a probate bond; tried on the general issue closed
to the court and reserved on facts found for advice.
On the 7th of October, 1867, the defendant, Solon B. Johnson, was duly appointed administrator on the estate of So.
phronia J. Urmston, by the plaintiff as judge of the Court of
Probate for the district of Cornwall, and gave the usual bond
as such administrator. On the 7th of April, 1868, Johnson
presented his administration account to the Court of Probate
for settlement, which account showed a balance of $978.93
remaining in his hands for distribution, and was accepted and
allowed by the court.
In pursuafice of the verbal order of the court, the administrator divided said sum of $978.93 equally tetween Seymour Johnson and Lewis P. Johnson, they being the brothers
of the deceased, and there being no other brothers or sisters
of the deceaged nor representatives of them, and took their
receipt therefor, which receipt was recorded on the records of
said Court of Probate, but no order of distribution was made
' y the court, and although the receipt was accepted by the
court in full settlement of the estate, yet by inadvertence
and mistake of the administrator no record of such acceptance was made. On the 28th of December, 1869, on application of the administrator, the Court of Probate made a formal
order that said sum of $978.93, remaining in the hands of
the administrator fdr distribution, be equally divided between
Seymour Johnson and Lewis P. Johnson, they being the
brothers of the deceased and her next of kin, and by the
laws of the State of Connecticut entitled to said money;
which order was duly recorded.
The intestate was lawfully mirried to Nathaniel M. Urm-
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ston on the 9th of April, 1857, and continued to be his lawful wife down to and at the time of her death, which was on
the 31st of August, 1867; she left no children, or legal rep.
resentatives of children, no sisters, or representatives of sisters, and but two brothers of the whole blood, Seymour Johnson and Lewis P. Johnson, both of Cornwall.
The deceased passed several years of her married life in
the States of Iowa and Missouri. In the month of May
1863, she removed with her husband from Missouri to Hills.
borough, Ohio, where she continued to reside, and where she
had her domicile at the time of her death. At her decease
she left personal property only, which at the time of her
death was in the hands of persons within the probate district
of Cornwall, and had never been reduced into actual possession by her husband.
By the law of Ohio, the goods, chattels, or other personal
estate of a wife dying intestate, leaving no children, and no
legal representatives of any children, vest in the husband.
The plaintiff claimed that the judgment of the court should
be for the plaintiff to recover the amount remaining in the
hands of the administrator, after paying the charges against
the estate, and that said sum belonged of right to Nathaniel
M. Urmston, for whose benefit this suit was brought. The
defendants claimed that said sum had already been paid by
the administ ator to the two brothers of the deceased, to
whom it rightfully belonged.
Upon these facts the question, what judgment should be
rendered, was reserved for advice.
A. S.Treat, for the plaintiff.
G. C. Voodruff, for the defendants.
PARK, J.-It appears in this case that the administrator,
on the 7th day of April, 1868, in pursuance of a verbal order of the Court of Probate, which was perfected and made a
formal order on the 28th day of December, 1869, made distribution of the estate in question to the persons that the
Court of Probate found were the heirs at law of the deceased,
and entitled to receive the same. This order of the Court of
Probate has never been reversed, but it now remains in full
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force, and we think it furnishes full protection to the administrator, and a conclusive answer to this suit on the probate
bond, until it shall be regularly set aside on appeal taken
from the order to the Supreme Court. We think this view
of the case is fully sustained by the following cases: Daven.
port v. Richards, 16 Conn. 310; Gates v. Treat, 17 id. 388;
Bi sel v..Bissel, 24 id. 241.
We advise a judgment in favor of the defendants.
We publish the foregoing case, not
so much because it contains any new
principle in the law affecting the settlement of estateg, but more because it
is the distinct reiteration of a very im
portaut rule upon that subject, and
one that it seems not easy for the professionalwaysto bear in mind. Somuch
of the litigatidn of the country is conducted in the common law courts, that
we are apt to think, on first blush, that
all questions maybetried there, unless

rious officers as executors and adminIstrators could obtain no effectual
quietus against actions at any time
within the term of the statute of limitations. We need add no authority to
confirm the decision of the court in this
case. But they will be found collected
in 3 Redf. Wills, 94 el seq., 266 di 8eq.
And we'may also refer to some cases
in Connecticut bearing on the same
general question: iPrahv. BuUon, 316
Conn. 292; Fairman's Apleal, 30 id 205'
There Is no rule of law better settled
than that the Probate Courts have the
exclnsive primary jurisdiction over all
questions pertaining to the settlement
of estates, and that the final decree of
such courts, unappealed from, is conclusive of the rights of all parties in.

exclusivelybelongingtoequityjuisdiction, and notalways sufficiently to bear
nmindtheimportance and extent ofthe
probate jurisdiction which extends to
all the personal property in the country
and more especially that it is an exclu.
sive jurisdictton.
It would be unfortunate if it were terested, in all other courts.
not so, since otherwise such merto-
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Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.
CARLOS HOLCOMB AND OTHERS V. ANSON B. TIFFANY.
The plaintiffs were selected as arbitrators between them by T and S and in
discharging the duties of their appointment incurred certain expenses for the
hire of a clerk. In their award thearbitrators awarded that T should pay them
a certain sum for their fees and expenses.
In assumpsit against T to recover the sum so awarded, brought by the arbi
trators jointly, In which the declaration contained a special count on the award
and the common counts for money paid and work and labor done, it was held
that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover on the common counts, and that the
fact that another was jointly liable with the defendant was no defense under
the general issue, but could be taken advantage of only by plea in abatement
Whether a recovery could be had on the special count, quore.
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ASSU3PSIT on an award of arbitrators, with counts for
money paid and work and labor done: brought to the Superior
Court and tried to the court on the general issue. The court
rendered judgment for the plaintiffs, and the defendant
brought the record before this court by motion in error. The
case is sufficiently stated in the opinion.
Hitchcock, for the plaintiff in error.
Goodwin and Foster, for the defendants in error.
CARPENTER,

J.-The plaintiffs were arbitrators to settle

certain matters in controversy between the defendant and one
John F. Simmons. Their award required the defendant to pay
to the plaintiffs a large portion of their fees and expenses
as such arbitrators, and this action is brought to recover the
same. The Superior Court found the facts, and rendered judgment for the plaintiffs. The declaration contains a special
count, setting out the submission and award, and also the
general counts. The motion in error assigns two causes of
error which seem to be relied on.
1. That it is not competent for the arbitrators to award a
sum of money payable to themselves, and maintain an action
on the award in their own names. This point, although alluded
to in the argument, is not referred to in the defendant's brief.
We have no occasion, however, to consider this question, as
it is not necessary to a determination of this case. The judgment of the Superior Court, so far as it rests upon the common counts, must be sustained. Whether it can be sustained
upon the special count is immaterial. The plaintiffs performed certain services, as arbitrators, at the request of both
parties, the defendant and Simmons. They are entitled to
compensation, and have at least a claim against both parties
jointly. That another is jointly liable with the defendant is
no defense under the general issue, but can be taken advantage of only by plea in abatement.
2. The second error assigned is that the cause of action in
favor of the plaintiftf, if any, is several, and not joint.
It appears that a part of the demand is for the services of
a clerk employed by the arbitrators as a board. In form they
incurred a joint expense, and may maintain a joint action.
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Concerning that there would seem to be no room for doubt.
In respect to the demand for services, that may be joint or
several, according to the circumstances of the case. They
acted as a joint board. No one of them could have acted as
arbitrator alone. He could only act in connection with the
others. Unless otherwise provided, all must concur in making
the award. In fixing the sum to be paid, we think it was competent for them to put it in the joint or several form at their
option. They named a sum in the aggregate, and made it
It does not appear
payable to them jointly as arbitrators
that there has ever been any division of the sum sought to be
recovered, nor what specific amount each was to receive, but
acting collectively, they demand a gross sum.
We think that the court below did not err in rendering a
joint judgment.
In this opinion the other judges concurred.
The foregoing case contains some shall'pay the expense of the arbitra.
practical suggestions which may be of tion involves no award in favor of the
interest to the profession. The %rst arbitrators. And where the expense
point, although not passed upon, isnot involved has reference to compensat.
one of much difflculty. That the arbi- ing the services of the clerk of the ar
trators could not award a sum tothem- bitrators, it seems not obnoxious to
selves, even by way of compensation any such objections. But clearly the
for services, admits of little question, quantum Meru count, and that for
since no man can be a judge in his own money paid, would cover the whole
cause, either alone or Jointly with oth- claum.
L F. B.
er. But merely deciding which party

vujpreme Court of Missoui.
ADAMS EXPRESS COMPANY V. CLINTON

RENO.

A. contract to pay money for the exercise of influence in procuring a pardon
Is void as against public policy.
The law will not lend its aid to carry into effect a contract which is contrary
to sound public policy, but will leave the parties as it finds them, in pari delicto
But this doctrine has no application to executory contracts. In all such cases
the parties can avail themselves of the locwv penitetiw, rescind the contract,
and recover back any money or property advanced under it.

EXPRESS CO. V. RENO.

THE facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court.

Lay & Belch for plaintiff in error.
H. B. Johnsonand James S. Botsford for defendant in error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
WAGNER, J.-This was a suit instituted by attachment, by
the plaintiff, an incorporated company, against John Reno, a
convict in the Missouri penitentiary, to recover damages for
a robbery alleged to have'been committed by him at Seymour,
Indiana. John Reno appeared by attorney and filed an
answer denying all the material allegations in the petition.
Over four thousand dollars, in United States currency, was
attached in the hands of the Jefferson City Savings Association as his property. Clinton Reno appeared and filed his
interpleader, claiming the money attached as his property.
To this interplea there was an answer filed, and upon the
issue as thus made up the cause was tried. After hearing
the evidence, the jury rendered a verdict, finding that the
property belonged to the interpleader, and upon this verdict
the court gave judgment in his behalf. From that finding
and judgment the plaintiff appealed to this court.
The appellant complains in the first instance of the action of
the court in refusing to grant a continuance. When the
cause was called for trial an affidavit was submitted, praying
for a continuance on the ground of the absence of material
witnesses, whose testimony could not be obtained or produced
at the trial at that term.
The affidavit was entitled the "Adams' Express Co., plaintiff, against John Reno, defendant, ana Clinton Reno, D. A.
Wilson, P T. Miller and Philip E. Chappitt: garnishees."
The court overruled the motion for a continuance, for the
reason that it did not appear that the affidavit had any reference to the controversy pending between the appellant and
the interpleader. The affidavit was distinctly entitled as in
the cause of the appellant against John Reno and the garnishees in that action, and as the issue joined on the interplea
constituted a wholly separate cause, there was nothing to
thow that the affidavit was made with any reference to this
proceeding. Under such circumstances we cannot say that
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the court erred or abused its discretion in refusing the con.
tinuance.
Upon the merits the facts seem to be these: John Reno
was sentenced to the Missouri penitentiary for robbing the
county treasury of Daviess county. The county court of
Daviess county authorized Ballinger, the sheriff of that county
to submit a proposition to Clinton Reno, that if he (Clinton)
would pay the sum of $5,000 toward reimbursing the county
of the amount robbed, then the judges of the county court
and Ballinger would use their influence with the Governor
to procure a pardon for John. In accordance with this proposition, Clinton Reno, who resided in Indiana, endeavored to
raise the five thousand dollars for the purpose contemplated,
but could only obtain the sum of four thousand four hundred
dollars. This amount he sent by his sister Laura to this
State, thinking that Ballinger might be induced to take it
and effect the pardon. Ie instructed Laura to bring the
money back with her in case the pardon was not procured,
and to pay it to no one but.Ballinger. When she arrived at
Jefferson City she did not see Ballinger, and nothing was
done toward a pardon, and when she was about to return
home she was persuaded by Wilson, the warden of the penitentiary, to leave the money with him, and that Ballinger
might come and accept it. She informed him of Clinton's
instructions as to bringing the money back, but was finally
induced to leave it. Wilson gave her a receipt for it and
then deposited it in the bank for the use of John Reno.
When Laura returned home Clinton was greatly displeased
with the disposition she had made of the money, and expressed his decided disapprobation of her course in disobeying his instructions. John Reno was never pardoned, nor
does it appear that any efforts were made looking to that end.
It is now insisted that, as the money was to be used for an
illegal purpose, the law will not assist Clinton to recover it
or in anywise help him in regaining its possession.
1o principle is better settled than that a contract in violation of law or against public policy cannot be enforced in the
courts of this country. In all such cases the courts will not
interfere, and the parties will be left where their conduct has
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placed them. An agreement to pay a certain sum for the
exercise of influence in procuring a pardon or the commutatation of a sentence is utterly void as against public policy,
and incapable of enforcement in 'the courts: ffribben v. Hay.
craft, 26 Mo. 396. But an examination of the cases will
show that this rule applies to executed contracts and agreements. Where parties have been guilty of turpitude in entering into illegal agreements, or have performed acts which
are stigmatized as against public policy, the courts of the
country furnish them no redress.
But if propositions have merely been made contemplating
such purposes, but nothing has been done to finally accomplish or consummate them, they stand in a very different
attitude. The moral stain has not attached, and the guilt has
not been carried out. The doctrine applies solely to executed
contracts, but I have not seen any case which would warrant
its application to contracts which are executory.
Betting on horse-racing is illegal, and it has been held that
where a person deposits money with a stakeholder to be held
to abide the result of a horse-race, he may institute a common law action and recover the same at any time before the
bet has been determined, and that the recovery may be without reference to any provision in the act concerning gaming:
Humphreys v. Magee, 13 Mo. 435.

In the case of Skinner v. Henderson, 10 Mo. 205, the question was directly presented, and it was decided that an action
would lie to recover back money paid under an illegal agreement, at any time before the agreement was executed. In
the opinion the court used this language: "The rule in respect
to money paid on illegal contracts appears in general to be,
that money so advanced may be recovered in an action for
money had and received, while the contract remains executory because a violation of the law is thereby prevented; but
if the contract be executed, it cannot be recovered back.
When both parties are in pari delicto, melior est conditio de-

fendentis, not because he is favored inlaw, but because the
plaintiff must draw his justice from pure sources. Buller's
Nisi Pris 132; Doug. 470."
The same principle was adjudged in Gowan's administra-
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t~rs v. Gowan, 30 Mo. 472,'it being there held that where a
debtor deposits personal property in the hands of another
bailee, with a view fraudulently to protect it from his creditors, such bailee cannot avail himself of such fraudulent intent to defeat an action brought against him by the debtor
for the recovery of such property.
These citations from our court are abundantly sufficient to
show the established doctrine in this State.
It is not pretended that there was any executed agreement
in this case. In fact it can hardly be said there was any
agreement at all. A proposition was made by a party, but
the record does not show that it was definitely accepted by
the other. Five thousand dollars was the sum held out as
the amount on which steps were to be taken looking to the
release. Clinton was unable to raise that sum, and there is
no evidence that he agreed to pay that or any other amount.
He sent what money he had to see if anything could be done,
but no arrangements were made, and it does not appear that
the matter was ever entertaijned or talked of after the money
was sent to this State.
Clearly there is nothing here to place him within the principle of the rule, or preclude his recovering the money. ,
It is further contended that Clinton parted with all interest
in the money when it was deposited in the bank to the use
of John, and that if he intended to retain the title he should
have given notice of his dissent from the disposition that
was made of it. But the parties who received the money
were apprised of the special circumstances surrounding the
deposit. The money was left with Wilson to be paid out in
a particular event and manner to Ballinger when John was
pardoned. It was placed in bank wholly for that purpose,
though nominally for the use of John. But it was not the
exclusive and absolute property of John and intended to be
so. Laura was acting as a special agent, appointed for a particular purpose, and she could not bind her principle by any
act beyond her authority: Tate v. Evans, 7 Mo. 419.
She had no authority to transfer the money to John, or to
anybody else except Ballinger, aild only to him upon the happening of a particular event. The law will not presume or

SAMUEL V. WILEY.

imply a ratification on the part of Clinton of Laura's unauthorized acts as to any party here contesting his right to the
money. The view that we have taken disposes of the instructions and renders it unnecessary to give them an especial
consideration.
Upon an examination of the whole record we are decidedly
of the opinion that the judgment is right and ought to be affirmed.
Supreme Judicial Court of New Ham2shire.
-
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'Upon afidavit of the complainant, in a proceeding in equity, that the defendant conceals his property so that no attachment or levy thereof can be made.
and that there is good reason to believe that he is about to leave the State to
avoid the payment of his debts, and sufficient evidence in support thereof, any
Justice of the Supreme Judicial Court, in vacation,is empowered to issue an
order requiring the arrest of the defendant, or an attachment of his goods or
estate, as security for the enforcement of the final decree of the court in the
proceeding in aid of which such order is issued.
Independent of statute authority, and under the powers essentially incident
to the obtaining security for the performance of its decrees, a court of equity,
or a justice thereof, in vacation, may by writ of cepia order the arrest of a
pmrty intending to leave the State in order to avoid such decrees, in a case
where the complainant has not a legal remedy and cannot hold the defendant
to ball
The authority and practice in such cases are analogous to the authority and
practice pertaining to the writ of ne ezeat regno. as recognized and administered by the English law.

THE facts relating to this case are sufficiently disclosed in

the opinion of the court.
Wood, for the plain'tiff.
Goodall,for the defendant.
FOSTER, J-There is a suit in chancery now pending before this court, in which the present defendant seeks the aid
of the court to compel specific performance: by this plaintiff,
of the contract set up in the bill.
After the filing of the bill, the complainant appended to a
copy thereof his affidavit, stating that "the within named
Patrick Samuel conceals his property so that no attachment
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or levy thereof can be made, and that there is good reason
to believe, and that I believe, he is about to leave the State
in order to avoid the payment of his debts."
Whereupon one of the justices of this court, in vacation,
issued the following order: "To the sheriff of any county
in this State, or his deputy: You are hereby cormanded to arrest the body of the within named Patrick
Samuel, or attach his goods or estate to the value of one
thousand dollars, and have him before the law term of the
Supreme Judicial Court, to be holden at Exeter, on the third
Tuesday of June next, to answer to this plaintiff."
The plaintiff in this suit was arrested by a deputy sheriff
and committed to jail. And now he claims that this arrest
was illegal, and seeks to recover damages against this defendant for having procured the same.
This court has the powers of a court of equity, in cases
cognizable in such courts, among which is the specific performance of contracts. Gen. Sts., ch. 190, § 1.
"Interlocutory decrees and.orders and other incidental pro.
ceedings may be had and done by one justice, in term time
or vacation. ' Chap. 190, § 12.
"Upon the application of any party to a suit in equity
an order may be made, when it appears to be required for
his security, for a writ of attachment in his favor, in such
form and returnable as the court may direct, against the estate or property of any other party." Chap. 190, § 7.
The prayer of the bill in equity for specific performance
of the contract would be idle, and a decree in answer to such
prayer of no avail, unless control might be obtained of the per.
son orproperty of the defendant; and, therefore, the legislature
has wisely given this court the power to issue the writ of attachment, whenever it shall appear to be required for the
security of any party asking for a final decree. Such necessity was made apparent in the present case, by the evidence
furnished, to the effect that the defendant in the bill concealed
his property, and was about to leave the State to avoid the
payment of his debts. Evidence of concealment and avoidance was sufficient to authorize the attempt to obtain security
by means of the writ of attachment. But the law has made
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still further provision for the complainant's security: "I"
any case, where no sufficient attachment has been made and
there is no sufficient bail, the court, or any justice thereof,
upon motion and satisfactory evidence that the defendant intends to leave the State, may order a capias to issue, on which
the defendant may be arrested and held to bail as on an
original writ." Chap. 206, § 12. In this case there had
been no attachment, and, if the defendant successfully concealed his property, there could be none; and evidence was
submitted to the justice that he was about to leave the State
so that ample foundation was laid for the issuing of a peremptory capias; and the defendant has no cause for complaint, that, by the order of the court, the capias was to be
executed only in the alternative of a failure to obtain security
by way of attachment.
The proceedings and the remedy are entirely inde]endent
of those provided by sections 7 & 8 of ch. 206, but they are
not invalidated by the adoption, to some extent, of the forms
prescribed by the law for the affidavit in the case contemplated by those sections.
It is said that the statutes to which we have referred were
not intended for application to proceedings in equity.
Considering the broad and unlimited language of see. 12
ch. 206-"in any case'-we should, certainly, not be at liberty to infer that the legislature did not intend to apply its
provisions to proceedings in equity, in which an attachment
was authorized, which would be wholly nugatory without the
additional grant of such powers as are incident, in suits at
law, to the failure to obtain that security which was intended
to be furnished by the attachment.
But assuming this position to be correct, we are of the
opinion that the justice had power, entirely independent of
those statutes and by the common law of equity procedure, to
issue the order in question.
Its purpose was to secure obedience to the decree of the
court; and its exercise is analogous to proceedings under the
English writ of ne exeat regno, which has been frequently
adopted in the practice of the American courts of chancery.
By chap. 189, § 1, Gen. Stats., this court has power to is-
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sue writs of error, etc., " and all other writs and processes to
other courts, to corporations and to individuals." This extensive grant, if it were requisite, would seem clearly to authorize the issue of the writ of ne exeat, or other analogous
process, when necessary to effectuate its decrees.
Although formerly only issued under the king's high prerogative, and directed against those machinating and concerting offenses against the ctown, ithas, at length, been applied
to prevent a subterfuge from the justice of the nation, though
in matters of private concernment: Wendell's note to 1 BI.
Com. 266; 2 Madd. Chancery Prac. 182.
It it now said to be an ordinary process of courts of equity,
and has come to be regarded as much a writ of right as any
other process used in the administration of justice: See
DeCarriere v. DeCallone, 4 Yes. Jr. (Sumner's ed.) 577 and
note.
The effect is to hold a party amenable to justice, and to
render him personally responsible for the performance of the
orders and decrees of the court, by preventing him from withdrawing himself from its jurisdiction : Johnson v. Clendenin,
5 Gill & Johns. 463.
It issues only upon an equitable demand, and not where
the plaintiff, by process of law, may hold the defendant to
bail: Atkinson v. Leonard, 3 Bro. C. C. 218; Jones v. Samp8on, 8 Yes. Jr. 594. It is resorted to for the purpose of obtaining equitable bail, and will be discharged on giving security: Howden v. Rodgers 1 Yes. & Ben. 129.
Whenever the defendant intends leaving the State, the
complainant, upon producing evidence of such intention and
of his equitable claim, has a right to equitable bail: Mitchell v
Bunch, 2 Paige, ch. 617. The writ may be applied for at
any stage of the proceedings: Dunham v. Jackson, 1 Paige,
ch. 629. The prayer for the writ need not be inserted in the
-,
18 Yes. Jr. 353; and no notice of
bill: Collinson v.
motion for the writ is required: Id.
The writ, with all its powers and limitations, and conform.
able to the English authorities and practice, is clearly recognized in the American courts as a writ of right, in the cases
where it is properly grantable-2 Story's Eq. Jur., § 1,469;
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and it is very commonly applied in the chancery practice of
the Federal courts, by virtue of United States laws: Act of
Congress of March 2, 1793, ch. 22, § 5.
The order upon which this arrest was made was not and
did not purport to be, a writ of ne exeal. That writ, as we
have seen, has for its special object the procuring of special
bail. In the forms described by Beames, the officer is commanded to cause the defendant to give bail in a certain sum
that he will not quit the kingdom without leave of court;
and for want of bail to commit the defendant to prison: 4
Bouv. Inst. 284.
But in its general purpose-namely, to prevent the avoidance by the defendant of the decrees of the court, the order
issued by the justice in this case is more analogous to the
form and procedure in case of the writ of ne exeat, than to
any other proceding known in American equity practice.
As in the case of the arrest on ne exeat the defendant would
be discharged on tender of sufficient bail, so, here, he might
apply to have the order superseded by-tender of bail or other
security. And if as we understand the fact to b e,our court
has all the powers that can be exercised by means of the
writ of ne exeat, we are unable to regard the order in thig
case as being in excess of the power thus conferred.
We are of the opinion, then, that not only under the authority of the statutes of this State, but independent thereof,
and as an incident to the power of enforcing its essential orders and decrees, any justice of this court, upon evidence satisfactory to him of a partys intention to leave the State, was
empowered to issue such an order as that upon Which this
arrest was made; that the same was therefore a legal arrest,
and that this defendant is not responsible to the plaintiff in
the present action.
It should, however, be remarked, that, since it is quite evident that the extensive power exercised in such cases is one
capable of abuse by unscrupulous or inconsiderate men in
authority, it should be resorted to only in cases of extrbme
necessity, and always applied with great caution. "I never
apply it," says Lord ELDON, "without apprehension:" 1 Yes.
& Bea. 373.

KING V. ASSOCIATION.

Carcuit (Qurt of the United States. Eastern District of Texas.
0. K. KING ET AL. V. YOUNG MEN'S MUTUAL REAL ESTATE AND
BUILDING ASSOCIATION ET AL.
In a suit to foreclose a vendor's lien it is necessary to make subsequent pur.
chasers, whose 'possession is known to the vendor, parties tothesuit, otherwise
their interest is not foreclosed.
The recording of a deed in the registry of mortgages is an invalid registry
of the deed as such, and imposes no legal or constructive notice uponthird per.
sons, but proof of actual notice is quite as effectual as constructive notice.
Lands encumbered with a vendor's lien forthe unpaid portion of the purchase
money having been sold by the vendee to a Joint stock company, and title con.
veyed to a trustee for said company: Held, that the stockholders of said joint
stock company, there being no trusteeat the time io represent them, areproper
parties to a bill to redeem said lands from a purchaser at sheriff's sale under
proceexings by the vendor against the original vendee solely, to foreclose his
ien.

Tnms was a bill filed to redeem certain lands in Harris county,
Texas, which were proposed as a site for a projected city to
be called New Houston.
ITV. P. Hamblin and E. P. Turner, for complainants.

Gray & Botts and Geo. Goldthwaite, for defendants.

The opinion of the court was delivered by BRADLEY, J.
The case stated by the bill is substantially this: That on
the eighteenth day of April, 1866, John T. Brady pur
chased the lands in question for $29,682.50, payable half
in cash and half in promissory notes, secured by a lien in the
nature of a mortgage reserved to thevendors in the deed.
That on. the 29th of December, 1866, Brady conveyed the
land to W. P. Hamblin as trustee for Isaac T. Tinsley and
his associates who contemplated organizing a joint stock
company for owning the same and laying it out into a city.
That the association was organized the same day by Tinsley,
Brady, and one William Brady, who chose the name of the
New Houston City Company, and resolved to have a capital
stock of 81,000,000 and to issue certificates therefor in shares
of $100 each; that they issued certificates for the said capital
stock, and that the complainants for a valuable consideration
received a certificate for 100 shares of the stock, which were
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expressed to be convertible at the option of the owner into
New Houston city lots at their assessed value upon the books
of the company and transferable only on the books upon surrender of the certificate.
That by virtue of this certificate thz complainants became
beneficially interested as stockh6lders in the New Houston
City Company and in all its property, particularly the said
lands.
That stock was thus issued to many parties in England,
New York, Texas and elsewhere, many of whom were unknown to the complainants. That the compauy took possession by their trustee and directors and remained in possession of the lands until February, 1869, when they were
sold by the sheriff of Harris county on a judgment on the
purchase notes before mentioned, and purchased by the
Young Men's Mutual Real Estate and Building Association.
That the said suit was brought to foreclose the lien as well as
t recover on the notes, but that no one but John T. Brady,
the maker of the notes and original vendee, was made a party
to the suit. No officer, director or stockholder be ing made a
party, although the plaintiffs knew that the company had
purchased the property and was by its trustee, officers and
tenants, in possession thereof.
That the Young Men's Mutual Real Estate and Building
Association took possession of and now hold the property,
and have ever since received the rents and profits thereof to
an amount greater than the debt. due; and that the trustee
for the stockholders of the New Houston City Company has
resigned or been displaced so that they have no one to represent them.
They therefore pray that they and the other stockholders
may be permitted to redeem the land. by the Young Men's
Mutual Real E-tate and Building Association accounting for
the rents and profits received, and the complainants being allowed to pay the balance of the debt if any remains.
The defendants set up three grounds of defense.
First. That the deed to Brady, of April, 1866, by reserving
the vendor's lien conveyed only an imperfect title to him,
which was determined by his failure to pay the notes, where49
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by the vendors or their assigns, the holders of the lien,
became entitled to the immediate possession of the property
by virtue of the superior and only legal title remaining in
them.
Secondly. That the deed from Brady to Hamblin was never
properly recorded and that the vendors and holders of the
notes had no notice of it, and therefore, were not bound to
make the trustee or company parties to the suit brought on
the notes.
Thirdly. That the complainants being merely stockholders
of the New Houston City Company have no legal interest or
equity of redemption which entitles them to. redeem the
property.
1. The first point after considerable examination and reflection, I think is not tenable. It assumes that the vendors'
lien in Texas is something superior to' and different from the
ordinary lien of a mortgagee holding a mortgage given -for
the purchase money of the property mortgaged. A careful
examination of the cases cited shows that this is not so.
The mortgage at common law transferred the legal estate
to the mortgagee, who could at any time take possession of
the property, and hold it until his debt was paid and the land
was redeemed. He could turn the mortgagor out of possession by an action of ejectment. (Story's E4., Sec. 1017.)
Nevertheless equity gives the mortgagor a right of redemption, which cannot be taken from him by anything short of
judicial process or a release from himself, or great lapse of
time in demanding his rights.
In many of the American States this right of the mortgagee
by virtue of his legal estate to take immediate possession is
modified, it is true, and in nearly all of them the interest or
equity of redemption of the mortgagor is regarded as a legal
estate, though subordinate to the rights of the mortgagee for
the purpose of collecting the mortgage debt. But in all the
States a mortgagee in ppssession after the debt is due cannot
be ousted by the mortgagor without redemption, of the property by paying the debt. Now, in Texas, I understand the
law to be precisely the same. The reservation of the vendor's
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lien in the deed is equal to a mortgage taken for the purchase money contemporaneously with the deed, and nothing
more. The purchaser has the equity of redemption precisely
as if he had received a deed and given a mortgage for the
purchase-money. If the debt become due and he fails to
pay it, the vendor may, by the peculiar forms of action,
which exist in Texas, either recover the land in a strict foreclosure or procure it to be sold at public sale to make the
debt. In both cases the mortgagor has an opportunity at any
time before judgment, and in case of sale, probably at any
time before sale, to pay the debt and relieve the land from
the incumbrance; in other words, he has a right to redeem.
And if the original purchaser has sold the land to a third
purchaser and the deed has been only recorded or made
known to the original vendor holding the vendor's lien, the
latter cannot turn such third person out of possession or extinguish his rights without legal process. No case can be
found I think in the Texas reports, which would sanction
such a doctrine. The rights of a vendee being the same as
those of a mortgagor, they must be extinguished in the same
way. They are vested and well defined in the law; they
constitute an estate, called, it is true, by the name of an equity
of redemption, but still an estate which may be conveyed,
encumbered and laid under other liens. And the heirs and
assigns of the vendee and subsequent holders of liens on the
property against him cannot be disregarded or ignored by the
original vendor who assigns when they desire to extinguish'
this estate.
The cases principally relied on to show a contrary doctrine
are Dunlap v. Wright 11 Texas 597; WTebb v. Afaxan, 11
Texas 678;

Ba7ker v. Ramey, 27 Texas 59;

Caldwell v.

Fraim, 32 Texas 324.
In the first case there was a mortgage for the purchasemoney and the vendor was in possession after the vendor was
in default, and remained in possession many years, until themortgage debt became outlawed. The vendee then sued for
the land without offering to redeem It is hardly possible to
imagine how a doubt could have been raised in such a case.
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Though the personal debt or the paper which represented it
might have been outlawed for the purpose of a personal
action, the claim of possession by the vendor as security for
the debt was not outlawed. It was continuous. The legal
title and the possession were both in the vendor. The vendee set up no equity to counteract those. How was it possible for him to recover ?
In Tebb v. ifaxan, the latter had purchased the equity of
redemption, but his purchase was unknown to the original
vendors, who obtained a decree to enforce their lien. Maxan
filed a petition for an injunction. The District Court granted
it and allowed him to redeem. The Supreme Court reversed
the decree. They say: "It is supposedthat the judge arrived
at this conclusion because Maxan was not made a party to
the suit for the foreclosure of the mortgage, and it is admitted as a subsequent purchaser, he ought to have been
made a party, if the fact of his being such incumbrancer
was known to the mortgagee. There is, however, nothing
in the record to show that the mortgagee at the time of the
commencement of the suit to forelose his mortgage knew
of this subsequent incumbrance; and there is no evidence
that the mortgagor had left the possession of the mortgaged
premises, and the inference is fair that he was in possession
when the suit was brought."
It seems to me tha this is a clear statement of the law exactly as I have supposed it to be. In Baker v. Ramey the
court held that the vendor's lien remained good although the
notes given for the purchase-money were barred by the statutes of limitations. This has been frequently held in other States.
In New Jersey, many years since, it was solemnly decided
and has always been regarded as good law, that ejectment on
the mortgage could be brought by the mortgage at any time
within twenty years (the time of limitation as to the real actions), although the mortgage debt was barred.
In Texas, where all actions and suits are the same in form,
the mortgagee would properly be entitled to recover the land
in like manner, notwithstanding the bar had occurred to the
debt. This peculiar feature of the law of procedure in Texas
is happily explained by Judge LINDSAY, in the last of the
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cases relied on, Caldwell v. Fraim. In that case the court
states the general effect of a reservation of a vendor's lien.
They say: "Under our system of jurisprudence, the vendor occupies the double position of vendor and mortgagee."
Again: "The perfect title under our law is the consolidation
of the legal and equitable titles which our courts may
accomplish on the trial of any cause, if the proper parties are
before them." Again: "If a mortgagee who has an interest
in land for the security of a debt is in possession of the mortgaged premises, the mortgagor cannot recover from him that
possession until the debt secured by the mortgage has been
paid or extinguished by the rents and profits." Again:
"Till the legal and equitable titles are consolidated in the
vendee, he has no cause of action against his vendor
for the possession; for in this suit for the possession the
title has to be tried, and the equity remains in full force as
long as there is an unpaid-residue of the purchase money."
In all this I see nothing at variance with the long and wellunderstood relations between mortgagor and mortgagee. If
the court means to say that the mortgagor, as between him
and the vendor, is not legally entitled to the possession of the
land, even before the mortgage debt has matured, they only
adopt the older views of the mortgagee's rights. If they are
referring to the relations which exist after the debt has matured, they state the more modern doctrine; but in nothing
do they disaffirm the views before expressed as to the essential nature of the equity of redemption, its assignability, and
the necessity of legal process against those notoriously interested in it, before it can be barred or foreclosed.
2. We come then to the second ground of defense-that the
deed from Brady to Hamblin was not properly recorded, and
was not known to the parties holding the purchase-notes when

their suit was instituted. It is admitted that the deed was
not recorded in the registry, or record book of deeds, where
tt should have been. The attorney of Gardiner, Bacon & Co.,
to whom some of the purchase-notes had been endorsed, and
who instituted the suit for the recovery thereof, when about
to commence proceedings, was informed by Hamblin that
such a deed had been given, and was recorded, but both he
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and Hamblin having searched for it, were unable to find it.
The fact is, it had been recorded by mistake in the registry
of mortgages.
I have not been referred to and have not been able to find
in the Texas registry laws any direction to record deeds and
mortgages in separate sets of books; but there is a manifest
propriety in so doing, and it is the universal practice throughout the country. That practice has been adopted in this
State.
I am inclined to hold, therefore, that the recording of a
deed in the Registry of Mortgages is an invalid registry of the
deed as such, and imposes no legal or constructive notice of
the deed upon third persons.
No one can reasonably be expected to search for deeds in
the record of mortgages. It cannot be a legal duty on those
to be affected by the registry. The registry of a deed given
by a person before acquiring title to the lands (who afterward
acquired title), not being in the regular order and chain of
title, has been held not binding on subsequent purchasers
and incumbrancers, because they are not expected to search
for deeds in such person's name before he acquires title. On
the same principle, I am of opinion that the registry of the
trust-deed in this case in the book of mortgages was void.
But the holders of the notes secured by the vendor's lien
were just as much bound to make the trustee a party to the
suit for foreclosure, if they had notice of the deed in any
other way, as if it had been recorded. Actual notice is quite
as effective as constructive notice.
But the defendants deny that they had actual notice. Much
evidence has been taken on this point, but it is unnecessary
for me to advert to it in detail. The circumstance already
adverted to, that the attorney of the mortgagees was directly
and positively informed by the original trustee, before instituting suit, that such a deed had been given, together with
the fact sworn to by the trustee and his successor, Turner,
that they were put into possession as such trustees, and that
the New Houston City Company under them, by its officers,
agents and tenants, actually possessed, occupied, used and
improved the land during the years 1867 and 1868, furnish
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such strong evidence of notice, that I am forced to conclude
that the parties had notice of the deed. The circumstances
operating to the contrary, such as the want of success in
finding the deed, and the fact that the Bradys representing
the company in the management of the land might as well
have been taken to represent the original purchaser, John T.
Brady, are not sufficient in my view to overcome the strong
presumption of notice arising from the facts of the case And
the verbal notice actually given to the attorney.
It is clear that the company by its trustees, officers and
tenants were in actual possession of the tract, and made considerable improvements on it, and possession is implied notice
of title; that is, it imposes upon third parties, interested to
know it, the duty of inquiry to ascertain the particular title
by which the possession is claimed.
I hold, therefore, that the mortgagees had sufficient notice
of the trust-deed to put them upon due inquiry of the proper
persons as to its contents, notwithstanding it was not recorded,
and they are to be presumed as having full knowledge of it.
3. But lastly, the defendants insist that, even if this be so,
the complainants in this case are not proper parties to bring
suit to redeem the property in question; that if the mortgagees failed to make sufficient parties to their suit for foreclosure, the party lacking in that suit was not these complainants, but was the trustee under the trust-deed, who at the
time of bringing suit on the notes, was N. P. Turner, the successor of Htamblin in the trust, and that he was aware of the
suit, and could have redeemed the property at that time by
paying the debt; at all events, that the complainants are mere
stockholders of the New Houston City Company, and not
even officers thereof, and have no such interest in the equity
of redemption as to entitle them to file a bill for redemption.
It is true that Turner was trustee at the time referred to,
and that he could, if supplied with fandL, have red]eemed the
He was not made a
property; but that is not ma'..ial.
party to the suit. Had he been made such a party, the company and its stockholders (it was a joint stock company, and
not a corporation) would or might have been put on their
guard, and would or might have provided him with means to
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pay the debt. The failure to make him a party, knowing, as
I have supposed the mortgagees bound to know, the interest
he had in the bonds left that interest unforeclosed. He, or
those whom he represented, are still entitled to redeem the
land by paying the debt. This would clearly be the case anywhere else except in Texas, and I think that I have shown
that the law of Texas is not in substance different in this
respect from that of other States.
But the question still remains, Are the complainants proper
parties to file a bill for redemption?
The proper person to file such a bill would be the trustee.
The original trustee to whom the trust was made was Hamblin. He resigned in 1867 in consequence of some difficulty
with the officers of the company, and a new trustee, Turner,
was appointed in his place by the directors, in pursuance of
the provisions contained in the deed.
Turner accepted the trust, and proce3ded in the execution
thereof, and as before stated, was trustee when the suij was
instituted on the purchase-notes; but a- he was president of
the Young Men's Mutual Real Estate and Building Association when that association purchased the land at sheriff's
sale, the New Honston City Company deemed him an improper person to represent it any longer as its trustee and
the directors of the company revoked his powers as such in
March, 1870, but appointed no other person in his place.
It is obvious that he would occupy a very anomalous and
contradictory position if he was required to represent the
New Houston City Company.
Even if his powers had not been revoked, the latter company would hardly have been guilty of an irregularity in filing a bill in its own behalf and making him a defendant.
They could undoubtedly have don& this upon alleging his
complicity with the defend rnts or his refusal to proceed. But
a; his powers have baea revoked, and as there is now no
trustee to represent the New Houston City Company, it seems
to be almost a necessity that the stockholders of the company, who are really tenants in common in the trust estate,
should be permitted to sue in their own behalf. Without
this there would be a failure of justice.
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It is true, the directors of the company have the power to
appoint another trustee; but if they fail to do this, the stockholders should not be precluded from pursuing the right to
which they are equitably entitled.
I am, therefore, of opinion that the present suit will lie.
The decree must be that the complainants be permitted to redeem the property by paying the entire debt, interest and
costs within thirty days after passing the final decree in the
case; that in the meantime it be referred to a special master,
to take and state as well an account of the rents and profits
received by the defendants as of the whole amount, one for
principal, interest and costs on the original purchase-notes, or
the judgment recovered thereon in the District Court of
Harris county; and that he have leave to use the evidence
already taken, and to take additional evidence, and to examine the parties, their books of account, etc.; and that the
amount to be ultimately paid by the complainants shall be the
balance that may remain unpaid after deducting the said rents
and profits from the amount of said debt, interest and costs;
but if the balance should be on the other side, that the defendants shall pay the same to the complainants; and that the
defendants, upon such payment being fully made, do convey
the premises in question to the complainants by a good and
sufficient deed in that behalf free and clear from any incumbrances made or suffered by them.

United States District Court, Southern District of New Yiork.
THE PHILADELPHIA AND READING R. R. CO. V. THE STEAMTUG J. H. GAUTIER AND THE SCHOONER HERBERT MANTON.

JAMES R. BENNETT ET AL. V. THE SAME.
The rule that "if two ships, oie of which is a sailing ship and the other a
steamship, are proceeding it such (ireetionsL as to involve ri!Ak of colisio,, the
steainship shall keep out of the wal- of the sailing, ship." applies to the e'ie of
a tug with her tow lashed along.,ldim., the tug amld Tier tow ure considered as one
vessel, and that a steam vessel.

THESE were libels filed respectively by the owners of a
canal-boat and her cargo, against the steam-tug J. H. Gautier
and the schooner Herbert Manton, to recover damages for a
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collision which resulted in the total loss of the boat and her
cargo.
T. Scudder and R. D. Benedict, for libellants.
W. R. Beebe and (. Donohue for the tug.
E. H. Owen and E. L. Owen for the schooner.
BLATCHFORD, J.-The libellants in the first suit, as owners
of the canal-boat Gettysburg, and the libellants in the second
suit as owners of the cargo of coal laden on board of said
canal-boat, bring these suits each of them against the steamtug J. H. Gautier and the schooner Herbert Manton, to recover damages for the total loss of the canal-boat and her
cargo through a collision which occurred between the canalboat and the schooner, on the 28th of November, 1871, between 9 and 10 o'clock, A. M., off the steamboat wharf at Astoria, Long Island, a short distance above the upper end of
Blackwell's Island. The canal-boat was at the time in tow of
the steam-tug, being lashed to the port side of the steam-tug.
The tug and canal-boat had come fron Twenty-third street,
New York, and were bound for the steamboat dock at AsThey
to be discharged.
toria, where the cargo of coal was
Island and ManBlackwell's
between
channel
the
up
had gone
sufficiently
far above
the upperthe
endtug,
of Backwell's
Island,
for
hattan
Island.
This required
after reaching
a point
safety, to swing around to starboard, by porting so as to head
across the channel she had come up,
across the upper
end of Blackwell's Island, and across the channel between
Blackwe11's Island and Long Island, to reach the dock at Astoria, and so as to present the port side of the canal-boat to
vessels proceeding through Hell Gate around Hallet's Point
to New York. The tide was the last of the flood. The
schooner went through Hell Gate from the eastward, rounded
Hallet's Point, and was proceeding on with a view to enter
the channel between Blackwell's Island and Long Island, when
she came into collision, stem on, with the port side of the
canal-boat, and the canal-boat and her cargo were totally lost.
The libels allege that the collision was caused by the care
lessness and negligence of those in chage of the tug and
schooner; that the tug was negligent in turning into the dock
ahead of the schooner, instead o" allowing the schooner to
pass clear between the tug and the dock, "as she would otherwise have done ;" and that the schooner was negligent in not
keeping a proper lookout, in not sheering out to avoid the
canal-boat, as she con] have done, "and in changing her
course back again afte" she had undertaken to pass outside."
The answers of the
allege
og ihat the wind was free for
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the schooner; that upon nearing Astoria, the tug and her
tow headed in toward the dock to which she was bound,
heading nearly or quite across the river, and, as she neared
the dock, gradually turning her head toward New York, so
as to bring the canal-boat next to the dock and the head of
all to the tide; that while the tug and her tow were thus approaching the dock, and when they were a very short distance from it, and heading on it, the schooner was coming
down through Hell Gate bound to New York, having the
wind free and a full sail breeze, with the whole river to the
New York shore side free for her navigation; that, as the
schooner came on toward the tow, she ported, so as to throw
her head off shore and her course outside of the tug and
canal-boat, and then suddenly kept away as if to endeavor to
force herself between the tow and the dock, from which the
tow was then but a few feet distant, the tow being then turning its course toward New York, and at a time when it was
impossible for the tug to avoid the schooner; that a warning
signal was given, but the schooner kept on and struck the
canal-boat on the port side a glancing blow, both vessels at
the time heading the same way substantially ; and that, at the
time of the collision, both the tow and the schooner were so
near the dock that the schooner came up along the end of the
dock, the canal-boat. at the time of the blow, being about the
width of the schooner from the dock.
The answers of the schooner allege that the collision was
caused solely by the fault of the tug and the canal-boat in
turning into the dock, and in crossing the bows of the schooner
in order to reach the same, in not stopping and allowing the
schooner to pass along, and in n)t sheering off and passing
under the stern of the schooner, either of which movements
could have been made without difficulty; that the schooner
had a competent lookout property stationed ; that she was lawfully prosecuting her voyage when the tug and the tow
approached; that she kept steadily on hcr course as she was
by law entitled to do, and did not change the same; and that
the tug and the tow attempted improperly to cross her bows,
and so threw themselves under her and thereby received the
injuries complained of.
There is no good reason why the court should not apply to
this case the rule prescribed by Article 15 of the steer'ing
and sailing rules in the Act of April 29th, 186- (13 U. S.
Stat. at Large 60), which is, that, "if two ships, one of which
is a sailing ship, and the other a steamship, ate proceeding in
such directions as to involve risk of collision, the steamship
shall keep out of the way of the sailin- ship," and the further
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rule prescribed by Article 18, that where, by Article 15, "one
of two ships is to keep out of the way, the other shall keep
her course, subject to the qualifications contained" in Article
19. It is manifest that negligence caused this collision, that
the canal-boat was without fault, and that either the tug or
the schooner or both of them were in fault. As respects
the schooner and her duty toward the tug and her tow,
lashed as the tow was to the side of the tug, and not towed
behind by a hawser, the tug and the tow must be regarded
as one vessel, and that a steam vessel. It was the duty of
the schooner to keep her course. The schooner had a right
to select, after passing Hallet's Point, a course, in the then
state of the tide and the wind, which would be most favorable for the prosecution of her voyage to New York. It is in
evidence that such course was a course, after roundingHallet's
Point, approaching toward the Long Island shore at an angle,
so as to go down through. the channel between Blackwell's
Island and Long Island. She adopted that course and kept
it. Such course would naturally carry 'her comparatively
near to the dock at Astoria, and would cause her, after rounding Hallet's Point, to approach nearer all the time to the
Long Island shore. There is no warrant in the evidence for
the conclusion that the schboner, at any time after rounding Hallet's Point, ported or turned her head to starboard.
The schooner had a right to rely on the rule of navigation,
and to suppose that the tug would stop in time and not attempt to cross the bows of the schooner. But the tug kept
on until, seeing there was 'danger, she blew one whistle,
and stopped and backed, but at too late a time. The schooner,
in the jaws of peril and to ease her blow against the canalboat, starboarded when a collision was inevitable and but a
moment before it occurred, and fell off a little, so that the
concurring forward motion of the three vessels and the action
of the tide brought them all near to the dock. It is impossible not to see that there was no fault in the schooner, and
that the collision was caused by the fault of the tug in not
stopping sooner and going under the stern of the schooner.
There was abundant room for her to do this, and no excuse
for not doing so.
There must be a decree for the libellants in each suit
against the tag, with costs, with reference to a commissioner
to ascertain the damages, and the libel must be dismissed in
each suit as to the schooner, with costs.

